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*Cov. L.J. 2  Introduction  
Although the abuses of fiduciary relationship have long been one of the major concerns of 
equitable jurisdiction, the concept of a fiduciary has been far from clear. In Lac Minerals v 
International Corona Ltd1 La Forest J. in the Supreme Court of Canada explained that 
‘…there are few legal concepts more frequently invoked but less conceptually certain than 
that of the fiduciary relationship.’2 In his seminal work Professor Finn described a fiduciary 
relationship as ‘one of the most ill-defined, if not altogether misleading terms in our law’.3 
It is, perhaps this lack of a comprehensive definition that has made the law of fiduciaries 
not only an interesting area for legal scholars, but also a difficult one for those asked to 
define the circumstances in which such a relationship will arise. English law categorizes 
certain relationships as fiduciary per se. This is no more than saying that certain relations 
are, by their very nature, fiduciary per se, that is, without further inquiry. Thus the settled 
categories of fiduciary relationships include solicitor and client4 ; agent and principal5 ; 
company director and the company6 , and trustee and beneficiary.7 However, despite 
certain relationships being categorized as fiduciary per se, the list of fiduciary relationships 
is not closed. The courts have, from time to time, admitted into the category of fiduciary 
relationships relationships that are not traditionally fiduciary. For example, in O'Sullivan v 
Management Agency & Music Ltd8 a manager was held to owe fiduciary duties to a singer. 
On the facts a new and inexperienced pop singer had entered into a contract on grounds of 
undue influence. The court held that, by virtue of his inexperience and the undue influence 
asserted by the manager, the facts gave rise to a fiduciary relationship. 
This article explores three major aspects of fiduciary law that have been the subject matter 
of much debate in recent times. The first aspect examines the circumstances in which 
English law will find a fiduciary relationship. In particular, this article examines whether 
there is a comprehensive definition of a fiduciary relationship or *Cov. L.J. 3  whether the 
finding of a fiduciary relationship is left to judicial discretion. The second aspect looks to the 
question of whether fiduciary relationships are capable of arising in commercial contexts. 
This has been a somewhat controversial question because the assumption appears to be 
that in commercial relationships the parties do not usually act in the best interests of the 
other. Thus, the question arises whether commercial relationships are repugnant to 
fiduciary law. The final aspect addressed in this article is the extent to which the strict 
liability of fiduciary law is justified in some of the fiduciary cases that arise in the modern 
law. 
 Grounds for the Imposition of Fiduciary Relationship  
Although certain relationships are fiduciary per se, the real question is: when will the court 
find a fiduciary relationship in circumstances when it does not fit into the recognised 
categories of fiduciary relationships? The problem is that the English courts have not 
provided a universal definition of a fiduciary relationship, instead, the approach has been 
very much one of judicial flexibility. Academics have attempted to address the matter by 
identifying certain factors that justify the imposition of a fiduciary relationship. For 
example, Sealy, after having reviewed the existing authorities, argued in 1962 that there 
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were essentially four categories of fiduciary relationship.9 He argued that the first two 
classes were reasonably capable of definition whilst the third and fourth classes were 
concerned with the application of certain presumptions that justified the imposition of 
fiduciary duties, thereby giving rise to a fiduciary relationship between the parties. The first 
category deals with the situation where one person has control over property for the 
benefit of another. Included in this category are persons such as trustees, guardians and 
bailiffs. Also included in this category is a donee of a power of appointment in 
circumstances when that power is imposed in the office, for example, of trusteeship.10 The 
second category deals with those situations where a claimant entrusts property to the 
defendant to perform a job in the best interests of the claimant. What is clear with Sealy's 
second classification is that there is no requirement that the defendant is actually dealing 
with property belonging to the plaintiff. Thus, whilst the majority of fiduciary relationships 
will involve some control over property belonging to another, according to Sealy's 
classification it is not crucial that there be some control over property. A good example of 
a situation falling into this category is the decision of the *Cov. L.J. 4  House of Lords in 
Reading v A-G.11 In this case, a British army sergeant stationed in Cairo allowed, by virtue 
of his uniform, civilian lorries carrying contraband goods to pass through checks points 
without any checks. The House of Lords held that the sergeant, by virtue of being employed 
by the Crown, stood in a fiduciary relationship to the Crown and thus was required to 
account for the bribes he had received from the smugglers. Whilst Sealy's second category 
does not require that the fiduciary be in control of property, it is questionable whether this 
is correct in light of a recent judicial pronouncement that a fiduciary relationship requires 
some control over property belonging to another.12 
The third and fourth categories of Sealy's classification are a little more complicated and 
work on the presumption that certain events have occurred which call for the imposition of 
fiduciary duties; thereby giving rise to a fiduciary relationship. In the third category are 
situations where a person, who is already in a fiduciary relationship, and who is controlling 
property for another, then acquires property for himself as a result of his position as a 
fiduciary. Any new property acquired will be deemed as an accretion to the original 
property. Sealy gives as an example the seminal case of Keech v Sandford13 where, as will 
be seen in more detail later, a trustee, having failed to renew a lease of a market for an 
infant beneficiary, renewed the lease personally. The court held that the new lease was to 
be held on the same terms and conditions as the original lease in favour of the infant. 
Another example which could be classified as falling into this category, although it could 
also fall into categories one and two, is the decision of the House of Lords in Boardman v 
Phipps.14 On the facts of this case, a solicitor acting in connection with a trust advised the 
trustees, who already held shares in a private company, that they should acquire more 
shares in the same company with a view to exerting greater control over it. The trustees 
refused to purchase further shares on the basis that the trust instrument did not authorise 
them to do so. After consultation with some of the trustees, the solicitor acquired a 
controlling interest in the company and made a substantial profit for himself, as well as 
restructuring the company and making profit for the beneficiaries. By a bare majority, the 
House of Lords held that the solicitor was required to account for those profits made in his 
capacity as a fiduciary. Despite the absence of dishonesty on his part, those profits had 
been made in his capacity as *Cov. L.J. 5  a fiduciary and thus belonged to the 
beneficiaries. The decision of the House of Lords in Boardman v Phipps15 illustrates the 
strict rule of equity that questions of good faith and honesty are generally not an issue in 
deciding whether the fiduciary is entitled to retain any property made in his capacity as a 
fiduciary. This matter is discussed in more detail below. The final classification deals with 
the imposition of a fiduciary relationship where one party exerts undue influence on 
another. The existence and possibility of undue influence is sufficient to generate a 
fiduciary relationship. 
Despite Sealy's categorisation, and indeed that of other academics writing in this field16 , 
the courts have not yet given a comprehensive definition of a fiduciary. Instead, judicial 
flexibility has resulted in the courts working on the premise that the central defining 
features of a fiduciary relationship is where one party is acting in the best interests of the 
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other party and therefore is required to owe a duty of loyalty to the other. Judicial 
pronouncements of these features can be found in a number of English law cases. In White 
v Jones17 Lord Browne-Wilkinson commented that ‘…the paradigm of the circumstances in 
which equity will find a fiduciary relationship is where one party, A, has assumed to act in 
relation to the property or affairs of another, B’.18 In Bristol and West Building Society v 
Mothew19 Millett L.J. explained that ‘a fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for 
or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a 
relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the 
obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single minded loyalty of his 
fiduciary…’20 In other jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada the courts have employed 
concepts such as ‘undertaking to act on behalf of another’ or ‘the exercise of a power or 
discretion so as to affect the principal's legal position’ to find a fiduciary relationship.21 
Although certain relationships have been described as fiduciary per se, the courts are not 
precluded from finding a fiduciary relationship in circumstances that justify the *Cov. L.J. 
6  imposition of such a relationship and the corresponding duties that follow with it. The 
reason for this is, as Millet L.J. explained in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew, 
that a fiduciary ‘is not subject to fiduciary obligations because he is a fiduciary; it is because 
he is subject to them that he is a fiduciary.’22 In other words, it is the particular 
circumstances which give rise to the finding of a fiduciary relationship, rather than the 
nature of the primary relationship of the parties. What the court is required to do is to 
examine whether any particular set of facts have the features that are identified by Millet 
L.J. in Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew. These features are: 
• An element of undertaking by the fiduciary to act for or on behalf of another to procure 
the best terms for that person 
• An element of reliance by the principal that the fiduciary will act in his or her best interest 
• An element of vulnerability; that the fiduciary may be in a position to negatively affect the 
interests of that other person 
Using these criteria the courts have found fiduciary relationships beyond the recognised 
categories identified above. Thus it has been possible for professional advisers, bank 
managers, mortgagees, doctors and employees to be subject to fiduciary obligations even 
though they do not fit into the recognised relationships that are fiduciary per se. 
 Fiduciary Relationships in a Commercial Context  
The extent to which fiduciary relationships can be imposed in a purely commercial context 
has been the subject matter of much debate in recent times. There appear to be a number 
of reasons as to why the debate is more acute in the commercial context than any other. In 
the first place, there has been the long-standing debate as to the proper application of 
equitable doctrines in a purely commercial context. In New Zealand & Australian Land Co. 
v Watson23 Bramwell L J explained that he would be very sorry to see ‘the various 
intricacies and doctrines connected with trusts *Cov. L.J. 7  incorporated into commercial 
transaction.’24 Similarly, writing extra-judicially, Millett L.J. commented that ‘it is of the 
first importance not to impose fiduciary obligations on parties to a purely commercial 
relationship.’25 The reasoning behind this relates to the nature of commercial transactions 
and the relationships created thereby. Unlike the relationship of trust, where the trustee 
undertakes to act in the best interests of the beneficiary, the assumption in commercial 
relationships is that each party is bargaining at arms' length and is not acting in the best 
interests of the other but has its own interests foremost. In the words of Snell, ‘it is 
normally inappropriate to expect a commercial party to subordinate its own interest to 
those of another commercial party.’26 
A second reason for the reluctance to have a liberal application of fiduciary law in a 
commercial context relates to the remedies that are available in cases of breach of fiduciary 
duty. Where a fiduciary breaches his duty of loyalty to his beneficiary, the beneficiary will 
have a right to equitable compensation in circumstances in which he has suffered a loss; or 
where the fiduciary has made a profit, he will be entitled to restitution. Restitution can be 
effected in one of two ways: firstly, by requiring the fiduciary to account for the profit; or, 
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secondly, by imposing a constructive trust on the profit so as to allow the beneficiary a 
proprietary claim to such profit. It is the imposition of the constructive trust that is more 
controversial in recent times. The reason for this relates to the fact that the imposition of 
such a trust gives a particular commercial party, which is the principal of a fiduciary 
relationship, priority over the property of an insolvent fiduciary. Leading academics have 
warned against the imposition of a constructive trust in such circumstances so as to adjust 
property rights on insolvency.27 
Despite the reservations about the proper role of fiduciary law in a commercial context, it 
would be nonsense to say that commercial transactions do not lend themselves to fiduciary 
obligations. Parties in a commercial relationship may well have intended to bring about a 
fiduciary relationship so that one party is acting in the interests of the other. Alternatively, 
the course of conduct between the parties may show that they are under a duty of loyalty 
to the other. Many agency relationships involve a commercial context where one company 
is acting in the interests of another. In other situations, the circumstances will themselves 
import a fiduciary *Cov. L.J. 8  relationship. For example, in the popularly cited Canadian 
case, LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd28 the Canadian Supreme 
Court found a fiduciary relationship in circumstances where two companies were 
negotiating a joint venture to exploit minerals. The land to be mined belonged to the 
plaintiff but the defendants, through the course of dealings, established that adjacent land 
also contained minerals. The defendants then mined the adjacent land without the 
plaintiff's consent. The Court held that the defendants owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs 
because they had obtained confidential information from the plaintiffs. 
More recently in Sinclair Investment Holding SA v. Versailles Trade Finance Ltd29 the Court 
of Appeal had the opportunity to revisit the grounds for the imposition of a fiduciary 
relationship in a commercial context. The facts of this case involved an appeal by Versailles 
Trade Finance Limited (VTFL) against an order of Mr Nicholas Strauss QC, allowing an 
appeal against an earlier order refusing to strike out claims in the case. The background to 
the appeal involved VTFL, which was an associated company belonging to a group of 
companies known as the Versailles Group. An important feature of the case was that a 
major shareholder in the Versailles Group was a company called Marrlist Limited, owned by 
Mr Cushnie who was also a director of the companies in the Versailles Group. VTFL was a 
subsidiary of a listed company, Versailles Group PLC. The business of the group involved 
accelerated discount trading. The court did not go into detail about the nature of the 
business of the Versailles Group, save to say that it involved raising money from third party 
investors and investing the money on their behalf in manufactured goods purchased from 
the manufacturer and sold onto purchasers. Sinclair Investment Holdings SA was one of 
the third party investors who had entered into a trader's agreement with VTFL. The terms 
of the agreement involved, inter alia, that Sinclair Investments would provide VTFL with 
£2.35 million for the purposes of buying and selling goods for Sinclair Investments. 
Despite the terms of the agreement between Sinclair Investments and VTFL, the monies 
advanced by Sinclair Investments were not used in accordance with that agreement. In 
fact, the money belonging to Sinclair Investments was used by the Versailles Group to 
increase its turnover with the result that Marrlist Limited was able to sell its shares in the 
Versailles Group at a profit. In other words, the profits enjoyed *Cov. L.J. 9  by Marrlist, 
and ultimately Mr Cushnie, were made directly as a result of Sinclair Investment's money. 
The reason why it can be said that the money still belonged to Sinclair Investments, despite 
being handed over to VTFL, is that one of the terms of the traders' agreement was that any 
of the money not used for the purpose of buying and selling goods was to be held on trust 
in a bank account for Sinclair Investments. This meant that VTFL was holding the money on 
trust for Sinclair Investments. The profits made by Marrlist Limited were used to repay a 
mortgage on a property in Kensington owned by Mr Cushnie and subsequently sold for £8.6 
million. This money had been paid to the receivers of VTFL from whom Sinclair Investments 
on full trial would attempt to recover. 
Sinclair Investments sought to recover their money from the £8.6 million pounds on two 
grounds. Firstly, that the profit made by Marrlist Limited and ultimately Mr Cushnie had 
been made as a result of a breach of a fiduciary duty owed to Sinclair Investments by Mr 
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Cushnie. Secondly, that part of the proceeds of sale were held on constructive trust for 
Sinclair Investments because the proceeds of the sale of the property in Kensington were 
made as a result of the fraud of Mr Cushnie who was responsible for increasing the turnover 
of the Versailles Group by misusing the money of Sinclair Investments. At first instance the 
Judge held that there was an arguable case on both of these points. VTFL, however, 
appealed, arguing that there was no fiduciary relationship between Mr Cushnie and Sinclair 
Investments and nor was there a general principle that a constructive trust should be 
imposed on a fraudster. These points can be examined in more detail. 
Whilst it is trite law that a director owes fiduciary duties to the company in which he is 
employed,30 does a director owe fiduciary duties beyond that of his company? The general 
position is that a director does not owe fiduciary duties beyond those owed to the company; 
thus, a director does not owe such duties to the shareholders generally. Mr Cushnie may 
well have been a director of the companies belonging to the Versailles Group and thus owed 
fiduciary duties to VTFL, but did he also owe fiduciary duties to Sinclair Investments? It was 
argued on behalf of VTFL that Mr Cushnie could not owe parallel duties to VTFL as well as 
Sinclair Investments for whom VTFL had become a trustee. This would simply put Mr 
Cushnie in a position of ‘hopeless conflict’.31 In support of this argument Counsel for VTFL 
cited a powerful passage from Millett L.J's judgment in Bristol and West Building Society v 
*Cov. L.J. 10  Mothew32 where his Lordship, when commenting on the features of a 
fiduciary relationship, explained that, ‘a fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make 
a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and interest 
may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the 
informed consent of his principal.’33 In the opinion of counsel for VTFL, Mr Cushnie simply 
did not give any undertaking of loyalty, express or implied, to Sinclair Investments. 
Although on the facts Mr Cushnie's relationship with Sinclair Investments could not be 
categorised as fiduciary in the sense of belonging to the recognised categories of fiduciary 
relationships, Arden L.J. in the Court of Appeal proceeded to answer the question whether 
Mr Cushnie could have acquired fiduciary obligations towards Sinclair Investments. In her 
Ladyship's judgment ‘if it is alleged that a person who does not fall within the usual 
categories of a fiduciary relationship, such as trustee and director, made manifest his 
intention to enter into a fiduciary relationship--that is, to undertake to the other a duty of 
loyalty - there would be a sufficient pleading of fiduciary relationship.’34 Having identified 
that a fiduciary relationship could arise where a person had undertaken a duty of loyalty to 
another, Arden LJ proceeded to examine whether it was a necessary pre-requisite to the 
finding of a fiduciary relationship that the fiduciary should have a relationship with any item 
of property belonging to the principal. This question was important on the facts because Mr 
Cushnie did not have legal title over the money advanced by Sinclair Investments to VTFL. 
Normally, in most other fiduciary relationships that are fiduciary per se, the fiduciary is 
exercising control over property for the benefit of another, for example the 
trustee-beneficiary relationship. In her Ladyship's opinion there was nothing in the 
authorities to suggest that there was a need for a fiduciary to have a particular relationship 
with any property. However, on the present facts this was a contentious issue because, 
although Mr Cushnie did not have legal title to the money advanced by Sinclair 
Investments, he was a director of VTFL and was in a position to control the exercise by 
VTFL of its powers over the money belonging to Sinclair Investments. 
In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, Mr Cushnie, although a director of VTFL and as such 
not owing fiduciary duties to the traders investing with VTFL, nevertheless had by his own 
conduct given an undertaking of loyalty to the relevant traders that their *Cov. L.J. 
11  sums advanced would be safeguarded and invested in an appropriate manner. This 
conduct was sufficient for the finding of a fiduciary relationship between Mr Cushnie and 
the traders. 
 The Nature and Standard of Fiduciary Liability  
The most basic duty of a fiduciary is not to allow himself to be put in a position where there 
is a conflict between his personal interest and that of his principal. This, often referred to as 
the ‘no conflicts rule’, will be applied rigorously by the courts. If the fiduciary allows there 
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to be a conflict, then inevitably it will result in him making an unauthorised or secret profit 
at the expense of his principal, or in the case of a trust, his beneficiary. Sometimes it is also 
said that fiduciary law is concerned with the law against secret profits. The matter is neatly 
summed-up by Lord Herschell in Bray v Ford,35 where his Lordship explained that: 
‘It is an inflexible rule of a Court of Equity that a person in a fiduciary position…is not, 
unless otherwise expressly provided, entitled to make a profit; he is not allowed to put 
himself in a position where his duty and interest conflict. It does not appear to me that this 
rule is, as has been said, founded upon principles of morality. I regard it rather as based on 
the consideration that, human nature being what it is, there is a danger, in such 
circumstances, of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather 
than by duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, 
been deemed expedient to lay down this general rule. But I am satisfied that it might be 
departed from in many cases, without any breach of morality, without any wrong being 
inflicted, and without any consciousness of wrong-doing.’36 
The nature of fiduciary liability was extensively considered by Millet L.J. in Bristol & West 
Building Society v Mothew.37 The question before the Court of Appeal was whether a 
solicitor, who was acting both for a lender and borrower, was in breach of a fiduciary duty 
in circumstances where the solicitor had given incorrect advice to the *Cov. L.J. 
12  lender. In holding that negligent advice given by the solicitor was a breach of duty, 
albeit not a breach of fiduciary duty, Millet L.J. explained the core elements of the basic 
fiduciary duty of no conflict of interest. His Lordship explained that: 
‘A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular 
matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The 
distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principal is entitled to 
the single-minded loyalty of his fiduciary. This core liability has several facets: a fiduciary 
must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself 
in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit 
or the benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is not 
intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary 
obligations.’38 
It has been suggested that the paramount duty of loyalty comprises two related themes.39 
The first comprises a general prohibition on a fiduciary allowing there to be a conflict of 
interest between his duty and interest. The second is a prohibition on the fiduciary making 
a secret profit from his position as a fiduciary. However, the two themes are inter-related 
because the very possibility of a conflict of interest will invariably result in the fiduciary 
making an unauthorised profit at the expense of his principal.40 
It is clear that a person standing in a fiduciary relationship owes fiduciary obligations to his 
principal or beneficiary. However, it should be noted that not all of the duties of a person 
categorised as a fiduciary are necessarily fiduciary duties. In other words, a fiduciary may 
owe parallel duties. For example, it is possible for a fiduciary to be subject to contractual 
duties or duties arising in tort whilst at the same time being subordinated to fiduciary 
duties.41 The matter is neatly explained by the decision in Bristol & West Building Society 
v Mothew42 where a solicitor was not in breach of a fiduciary duty in circumstances where 
he had given negligent advice to his client. *Cov. L.J. 13  Although the negligent advice 
was a breach of duty, it could not be properly categorised as a breach of his fiduciary duty. 
In the course of his judgment Millet L.J. explained that: 
‘The expression fiduciary duty is properly confined to those duties which are peculiar to 
fiduciaries and the breach of which attracts legal consequences differing from those 
consequent upon the breach of other duties. Unless the expression is so limited it is lacking 
in practical utility. In this sense it is obvious that not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is 
a breach of fiduciary duty.’43 
There are many examples of the concurrency of fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties imposed 
on a particular individual. For example, it is trite law that a trustee owes fiduciary duties to 
his beneficiary. However, a trustee who fails to invest the trust funds will be liable for 
breach of trust and not for breach of fiduciary duty. His failure to invest the trust funds 
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arises from trust law and not from the fact that he stands in a fiduciary relationship to the 
beneficiary. The concurrency of fiduciary and non-fiduciary relationships is illustrated in the 
decision of the Court of Appeal in A-G v Blake.44 The facts of this case concerned a certain 
Blake who was a member of the Crown Secret Intelligence Service from 1933 to 1961. In 
1951 he became an agent for the former Soviet Union and was eventually convicted and 
sentenced to 42 years in prison for communicating information contrary to the Official 
Secrets Act 1911. In 1966 he managed to escape from prison and went to live in Moscow. 
In 1990 he published a book ‘No Other Choice’ which detailed his activities as a member of 
the Secret Service. This publication was without permission from the Crown who 
subsequently sought to recover profits he had made as a result of the publication of the 
book. The Attorney-General acting for the Crown argued that the profits on the book had 
been made as a result of breach of his fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to the Crown. The 
basis of the argument was that Blake was a former servant of the Crown and as such owed 
fiduciary duties to the Crown. Furthermore, the information he had acquired about the 
Secret Service was imparted to him in his capacity as a servant of the Crown and that this 
information was now being used to make a profit. 
The Court of Appeal accepted that when Blake was employed he owed the Crown a core 
fiduciary obligation of loyalty. His Lordship explained that ‘the core obligation of *Cov. L.J. 
14  a fiduciary of this kind is the obligation of loyalty. The employer is entitled to the 
single-minded loyalty of his employee. The employee must act in good faith; he must not 
make a profit out of his trust; he must not place himself in a position where his duty and his 
interest may conflict; he must not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third party 
without the informed consent of his employer.’45 However, the Court of Appeal held that 
Blake was not acting in breach of fiduciary duty when the book was published. Lord Woolf 
MR explained that whilst Blake was employed he undoubtedly owed fiduciary duties to the 
Crown. However, these duties only lasted as long as the relationship giving rise to it lasted; 
the fact that Blake was no longer employed when the book was published meant that he did 
not any longer stand in a fiduciary relationship with Crown. The Court of Appeal did, 
however, hold that although there had been no breach of fiduciary duty, Blake had 
committed a breach of contract on the grounds that his contract of employment required 
clearance before writing the book. Furthermore, it held that the Crown had a legitimate 
interest in ensuring that confidential information was not disclosed in breach of contract. 
Accordingly, the Court ordered that the profits should be paid over to the Crown.46 
It is clear now that a fiduciary owes onerous duties to his principal. It should also be made 
clear that the standard of liability is strict. The courts will not entertain questions of honesty 
or whether the fiduciary acted in good faith. If there is a possibility of a conflict of interest 
and the fiduciary allows that conflict to occur then he will be liable and subject to the 
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty. For example, in Bray v Ford47 the court explained 
that a breach of fiduciary duty ‘may be attended with perfect good faith’48 and furthermore 
that the conflict rule ‘might be departed in many cases, without any breach of morality, 
without any wrong being inflicted, and without any consciousness of wrong doing.’49 The 
same view was echoed in Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver50 where Lord Russell of Killowen, 
when dealing with the fiduciary duties of a director, explained that: 
‘The rule of equity, which insist on those, who by use of a fiduciary position make a profit, 
being liable to account for that profit, in no way depends on fraud, or absence of bona fides; 
or upon such questions or considerations as *Cov. L.J. 15  whether the profit would or 
should otherwise have gone to the plaintiff, or whether the profiteer was under a duty to 
obtain the source of the profit from the plaintiff, or whether he took a risk or acted as he did 
for the benefit of the plaintiff, or whether the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or 
benefited by his action. The liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having, in the 
stated circumstances been made. The profiteer, however, honest and well intentioned, 
cannot escape the risk of being called upon to account.’51 
Perhaps a good illustration of the lack of dishonesty and the absence of bad faith being 
irrelevant factors in determining liability is the decision of the House of Lords in Boardman 
v Phipps.52 It will be recalled that in this case Boardman was a solicitor providing his 
services to trustees under a will. The trustees were holding 8000 shares out of an issued 
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30000 in a private company. Boardman advised the trustees that there was substantial 
scope for making a profit on the shares in the private company and therefore they should 
purchase more of the shares in the company. The trustees refused to purchase the shares 
because the trust instrument did not allow the acquisition of further shares in the same 
company. Boardman used the knowledge he had gained from the trust to purchase the 
remaining shares in the private company. After reorganisation of the private company, the 
shares he acquired were sold at a profit. He made a profit in the region of £75,000 as well 
a benefit to the trust shares in the region of £47,000. The House of Lords held by a majority 
of 3:2 that Boardman was a constructive trustee of the profits made and as such was 
required to account for them. In coming to this decision, the House of Lords paid 
significance to the fact Boardman had made the profit because he had acquired knowledge 
of the shares by virtue of the fact that he was acting as solicitor to trustees of the trust 
fund. Furthermore, it mattered not that the trustees could not have used the information 
for their own benefit. The fact remained that Boardman made the profit by virtue of his 
position as solicitor to the trust fund with specific knowledge of the company and the 
shares within it. Boardman, however, was authorised to retain some of the profit by way of 
remuneration on the basis of quantum meruit. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords were aware that Boardman was a man of great ability and had expended labour in 
re-organising the company and increasing the share therein. 
 *Cov. L.J. 16  The absence of bad faith being an irrelevant factor in determining the 
liability of the fiduciary was also illustrated in another decision of the House of Lords in 
Guinness v Saunders.53 On the facts of this case, a director of a company received a sum 
of £5.2m under a contract he had entered into to provide his services in relation to a 
take-over bid. Thomas Ward, a former non-executive director of Guinness, was employed 
to provide his services to Guinness in relation to the takeover bid for Distillers. Ward had 
been a former non-executive director of Guinness and, despite the absence of any bad faith 
on his part, the House of Lords held that he had failed to disclose his former interest to the 
company Board. On this basis the House of Lords held that he was liable to account for the 
money he had received. 
 The Rationale for the Strict Approach  
Why does fiduciary law adopt a very strict approach to the no-profit rule? It has been 
observed that where a profit is made by a fiduciary the court will require that the profit be 
returned to the principal or beneficiary despite the honesty or good faith of the fiduciary. 
Furthermore, the strict approach in English Law is further illustrated by the fact that the 
courts will require the fiduciary to return any profits made in circumstances when the 
opportunity to make such profits could not be utilised by the beneficiary. For example, it 
has been seen in Boardman v Phipps54 that although the beneficiaries were never in a 
position to acquire further shares in the private company, albeit through their trustees, 
nevertheless Boardman was required to account for the profit he made on the shares. 
Similarly, in Keech v Sandord55 it was observed at the outset of this article that the infant 
beneficiary was not in a position to renew the lease of Romford Market; nevertheless, the 
trustee was required to assign the lease to him and account for profits. The rationale for the 
strict approach hinges on a delicate matter of evidence. From the early nineteenth century 
the Court of Chancery preferred a deterrence approach because of the evidential difficulties 
involved in determining the motive of the fiduciary and establishing whether he did act 
honestly and in good faith. Honesty and good faith are by their very nature subjective 
criteria in law and involve determining the individual state of mind of the fiduciary. The 
ultimate question is whether the fiduciary has really put the interests of the beneficiary 
first, or whether his decision was clouded by the fact that he sees the opportunity to make 
a profit for himself. The matter is neatly explained by Moffat: 
 *Cov. L.J. 17  ‘The courts of equity in the nineteenth century, particularly, under the 
early guiding influence of Lord Eldon, favoured the deterrent approach. This was in large 
measure because of concern over evidentiary difficulties facing a court in determining a 
trustee's motives where a possible conflict existed.’56 
In more recent times, it has been doubted whether this strict approach adopted in some of 
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the eighteenth century cases is justified in modern fiduciary law. 
 Is the Strict Liability Approach in Fiduciary Law Justified in the Modern 
Law?  
In one relatively recent case Lord Browne-Wilkinson commented that it is ‘…wrong to lift 
wholesale the detailed rules developed in the context of traditional trusts and seek to apply 
them to trusts of quite a different kind.’57 This observation has been quite interestingly 
used by one leading treatise on the law of trusts to question whether the strict liability 
approach of fiduciary law is justified in the modern law of trusts.58 In this article it has 
been observed that where a fiduciary makes an unauthorised profit, he will be required to 
return it to his principal irrespective of his good faith and honesty. Fiduciary law, however, 
goes further and holds that a fiduciary will be under a duty to effect restitution even when 
the profit he has made could never have been made by his principal. For example, cases 
such as Keech v Sandford,59Boardman v Phipps60 and Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver61 all 
make it clear that a profit that is made in circumstances where the principal could not have 
utilised the opportunity to make the profit for himself must nevertheless be returned to the 
principal. Historically, the justification for the strict rule related to the evidential issues 
involved in establishing the true motive of the fiduciary. Essentially, the question was 
whether the fiduciary had put the interests of the principal before his own interest. 
In a number of modern cases the evidential issues that concerned the early Court of 
Chancery do not arise. The cases involve situations where there is no possibility that the 
principal could have utilised the opportunity. Take, for example, Regal (Hastings) v 
Gulliver62 , the facts of which concerned the purchase of two cinemas by the plaintiff 
*Cov. L.J. 18  company which already owned one cinema in Hastings. The intention was 
that the three cinemas would be acquired by the plaintiff company and then sold off 
together. In order to facilitate the purchase of the cinemas, a subsidiary with a capital of 
5000 shares was formed so as to take leases of the cinemas. However, only 2000 of the 
shares were fully paid, which proved to be fatal because the owner of the cinema was only 
willing to grant leases of the cinema on the grounds that all the shares were fully paid up. 
The plaintiff did not have any further money to pay into the subsidiary. Four directors and 
an outsider then acquired the remaining shares and the cinemas were eventually taken 
over with the directors making a substantial profit on the respective sale of their shares. 
The plaintiff then bought an action to recover the profits made by the directors on the 
grounds that it was made in breach of fiduciary duty. The action succeeded in the House of 
Lords on the grounds that the directors had acquired the shares in their capacity as 
fiduciaries. The House of Lords were firmly undeterred by the fact that the company could 
not itself have acquired the shares. The court was firmly of the opinion that the law in 
Keech v Sandord laid a strict rule that a fiduciary was not allowed to make an unauthorised 
profit. 
The decision in Regal (Hastings) v Gulliver exemplifies the strictness of the common law. 
However, it is questionable whether this strict approach is justified in circumstances where 
there are no real evidential issues as regards the fiduciary's motives. For example, in Regal 
(Hastings), the company was never in a position to acquire the shares in the subsidiary. 
The directors did not abuse their position in order to get the shares and the profit was made 
in good faith. AJ Oakley makes reference to a number of cases from other jurisdictions 
where a more flexible approach has been adopted.63 The Supreme Court of Canada ruled 
in Peso Silvermines v Cropper64 that a director was entitled to retain profits made from 
certain mining claims. The company, on whose board he sat, had initially declined to take 
those claims. Likewise in Consul Development v D.P.C. Estates65 the High Court of 
Australia was of the view that the manager of a company could purchase property for 
himself that the company for whom he was working did not want to purchase themselves. 
AJ Oakley concludes by commenting that ‘if Lord Browne-Wilkinson's remarks cause judges 
to think twice before they automatically apply conclusions reached in totally different legal 
and economic contexts to modern conditions, English *Cov. L.J. 19  Law may indeed one 
day adopt the more flexible attitudes already manifested in other jurisdictions.’66 
 Conclusion  
    Page10 
Although the law of fiduciaries has evolved over some 250 years, it remains an area of 
English law that perhaps, raises more questions than answers. Whilst the law recognises 
certain categories of relationships as fiduciary, recent judicial pronouncements illustrate 
that the finding of a fiduciary relationship is not dependant on such categorisation. Rather, 
it is the very circumstances of individual cases that may subject a particular person to 
fiduciary duties thereby making that person a fiduciary. This judicial flexibility has allowed 
the courts to find fiduciary relationships in contexts that were once assumed to be immune 
to fiduciary law. For example, in commercial contexts it is quite possible that one party may 
subordinate to the interests of another. 
What does, however, remain the subject matter of much debate is the strict liability 
approach of fiduciary law. It has been observed in this article that the English courts 
continue to adopt the strict liability to the no-profit rule. Thus, where a fiduciary makes a 
secret profit, the courts will require full restitution even in circumstances where that profit 
could not have been made by the beneficiary. It is submitted that, whilst the strict liability 
rule was justified in the context of some of the nineteenth century cases where evidential 
issues prevented the court from ascertaining the intention of the fiduciary, in modern cases 
it is questionable whether such an approach is justified. There is much to be said for recent 
judicial calls for recognition that it is not appropriate to apply laws decided in a wholly 
different context to a different kind of situation. This recognition has already been made in 
a number of commonwealth jurisdictions and it remains to be seen how far English lawyers 
follow suit. 
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